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This paper proposes a model of a cruising taxicab industry under laissez faire pricing and free 
entry, and compares it with alternative regimes including collusive fare setting, collusive 
restrictions on entry, or both.  In the model, under laissez faire, prices are determined by Nash 
bargaining with complete information and lie above marginal costs.  Under laissez faire pricing 
and free entry the number of vacant cabs need not be efficient and could be either higher than 
optimal or less depending upon the relative bargaining power of individual cabs and potential 
customers.  Under collusive control of entry, the number of vacant cabs will be set at the 
efficient level given the prices, which if set collusively will be above the laissez faire prices.  
These findings shed new light on the political success of cartelizing regulation of the cruising 
taxicab industry such as that observed in Japan.  JEL classifications D40, L43, L51 and L92. 
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TAXICAB REGULATION IN JAPAN 
 
1. Introduction. 
     Many economists over the years have sought to understand the rationale and economic effects 
of taxicab regulation.  Nevertheless, a convincing model of the pricing and supply of cruising 
taxi services in the absence of regulation remains elusive.  It might seem very natural to model 
the laissez faire situation as one in which taxis each precommit to a posted price and fully 
informed demanders then choose to wait for a cruising cab or not.  But as Stiglitz (1989) has 
argued, a pure-strategy Nash solution does not exist under this regime.  In particular, if all cabs 
but one set the same price, then the one always enlarges its own revenue and profit by slightly 
raising its price above the others.  The unlikelihood that any one demander will hail this cab is 
small and so its price has a negligible effect on the market demand.  Yet the one whose 
misfortune it is to hail that cab will not wave it off because this would mean waiting for the next 
idle cab and waiting is a bad.  All cabs reason the same way.  So no equilibrium price exists.  
Under laissez faire the cab fare paid by each customer is the result of bargaining between him 
and the one taxi.  A model that incorporates this feature is needed to dissect the laissez faire case.  
And here we encounter still further difficulties.  As Cairns and Liston-Heyes (1996) observe, the 
Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983) theorem implies that bargaining between a cab driver and 
potential customer will not in general attain an efficient outcome if neither has an alternative 
trading partner at the moment (and so are uninformed regarding one another’s valuations of 
trading).  On this basis they suggest that regulation could therefore be beneficial in low demand 
periods.  That may be, although one wonders how the regulators would become apprized of the 
same private information befuddling the traders themselves, even assuming they escape industry 
capture and so are able to act on the information in an efficient way.  In any case this still leaves 
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open the question on which I wish to focus, namely what is the precise character of the laissez 
faire regime.  
     The Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem of course presumes asymmetric information.  If we drop 
that assumption–which timid souls may be unwilling to do–then it becomes possible to model the 
bargaining between cab driver and potential customer using the Rubenstein (1982) alternating 
offers setup.  As I shall demonstrate below, this sort of approach accounts for the two-part 
pricing of taxi services under laissez faire.  Furthermore it gives concreteness to comparisons of 
the taxi industry under laissez faire and under alternative regulatory regimes.  The rationale and 
effects of regulation then become transparent.  The nub of the matter is that the laissez faire 
regime as so construed (fares determined by Nash bargaining between each cab and customer) 
need not result in the efficient number of vacant cruising cabs.  The number of vacant cabs could 
be either higher than optimal or less depending upon the relative bargaining power of individual 
cabs and potential customers.  If the cab firms hold all of the bargaining power, as would be true 
under a cartel, or what amounts to the same thing a fully captured regulatory apparatus, then the 
number of vacant cabs and implied waiting time to hail a cab would be economically efficient. 
     For concreteness we focus on details of the Japanese regulatory regime but much of our 
analysis has applicability to taxicab regulation everywhere.  We begin by describing the Japanese 
taxicab regulation and recent steps towards deregulation.  Then we develop the  model of taxicab 
pricing under laissez faire sketched above and use that model to speculate on the likely effects of 
taxicab regulation and deregulation.  In particular, freeing entry while continuing to regulate 
fares, which Japan has effectively done as of February 2002 is likely to worsen allocation both 
compared to regimes in which fares and entry are both regulated (the status quo ex ante in Japan) 
and in comparison to complete laissez faire.   
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 2. Taxicab regulations of Japan. 
 
     The taxicab industry of Japan is subject to price and entry regulation by the national 
government (ministry of transport) under authority of the 1951 Road Transport Law. 1  In this 
law, hire taxis (kashi kiri takushii) are distinguished from charter buses only insofar as buses 
carry 11 or more passengers and taxis 10 or fewer.  Operation of a taxicab firm within any 
specified local region of Japan requires a license (menkyo) issued by the minister of transport.  
Article 6 of the Road Transport Law directs the minister of transport, in deciding whether to 
issue a license, to consider (among other things) whether entry of the applicant would cause the 
supply of taxi services to exceed the demand.2  This would seem to confer fairly sweeping 
authority to restrict entry, for if the regulated price is set high enough, any amount supplied will 
exceed the amount demanded.  License applications specify the precise number of vehicles the 
firm intends to operate and any subsequent changes in that number whether increases or 
decreases require a new license.  Licenses of individual taxi operators (that is sole proprietors, 
not the employees of taxicab firms) may only be issued to applicants over the age of 35 with 
previous experience as employees of licensed taxicab companies and who have passed 
examinations concerning both street directions and traffic laws. 
     According to the same Road Transport Law (article 9, section 2) cab fares are subject to prior 
approval (ninka) by the minister of transport.  The law stipulates that such approval be 
                                                 
1On the basic facts regarding the Road Transport Law refer to Matsuzawa and Ishida (1995). 
2The relevant passage included among the list of items to be considered in granting licenses to 
newly entering taxicab firms: “That entry of the firm in question would not, by virtue of its 
proposed service area or routes, cause the quantity of transport supplied to exceed the quantity 
demanded.” ( tougai jigyou no kaishi ni yotte tougai rosen mata wa jigyou kuiki ni kakaru 
kyoukyuu yusou ryoku ga yusou juyou ryou ni taishi fukinkou to naranai mono de aru koto.) 
Road Transport Law, article 6. The other considerations pertain to the applicant’s proper 
qualification to supply the proposed services. 
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contingent on five considerations: (1) consistency with normal profit, (2) obeisance with the 
principle of nondiscrimination, (3) that the fare is not overly burdensome to passengers, (4) does 
not unfairly compete with the fares charged by trains or buses, and (5) lies within a range that is 
prescribed by the ministry.  In 1955, responding to an outbreak of price competition among 
Tokyo cabs, the transport ministry adopted a principle that fares be the same for all cabs in the 
same size category operating within any given local area during the same hours.  Fares were set 
slightly higher for large cabs than for mid-sized cabs or small cabs and set 30% higher after 
midnight, but within these categories were uniform within local regions. 
     In short, the Road Transport Law has vested the transport ministry of the national government 
with very broad powers to determine the number of taxicabs in each city and region of Japan and 
to also determine the fares.  As part of a broad Japanese government mandate to deregulate, in 
June 1992 the transport ministry announced its intention within ten years to relax its 
implementation of this authority in two ways.  It proposed to place less weight on the supply and 
demand considerations in bestowing licenses, and to reconfigure the fare structure to allow prices 
that are not strictly uniform within each geographic region.  The first tangible manifestation of 
this new attitude towards the fare structure was the July 1993 introduction of a dual fare structure 
in the Osaka metropolitan region. 19,000 cabs were permitted to set initial fares of 600 yen, 
while 759 cabs were permitted to set the initial fare of 540 yen.  The lower fare was applicable to 
the cabs of 6 companies and 3 individuals.  In the following year 1994 a few individual taxicab 
operators in Osaka were allowed to refrain and did refrain from joining the great mass of cab 
firms and other individual operators in seeking to raise the permissible initial fare.  The same 
year in Aomori prefecture two cab firms similarly refrained from joining rivals in seeking to 
raise their permissible initial fare.  And in December 1993 three of the four Kyoto cab firms 
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constituting the MK Group sought and obtained permission to actually lower their initial fares 
from 530 yen to 470 yen for small cabs and from 540 yen to 480 yen for mid-size cabs.3  The 
remaining member of the MK Group sought and obtained permission to raise its initial fare from 
530 yen to 580 yen for small cabs and from 540 yen to 590 yen for mid-size cabs.  At this same 
time all the other Kyoto cabs sought and obtained permission to raise initial fares from 590 yen 
to 630 yen for small cabs and from 600 yen to 640 yen for mid-size cabs.  The end result was an 
unprecedented situation in which three different fare structures were permitted within the same 
geographic region.  The four companies of the MK Group together operated 459 vehicles, about 
5% of the Kyoto cab fleet. 
     Besides introducing a maverick fare structure, the MK Group sought two further  
unprecedented concessions.  One was permission to run taxis along preset routes stopping only at 
city bus stops.4   This permission was denied.  The other petition, which was allowed, treated 
MK cab drivers over the age of 60 and having 20 or more years of service as “individual 
operators” with their own licenses, even though they continued to operate MK cabs.  In effect 
this allowed MK to expand its fleet (by six vehicles) without itself obtaining a new license.  
These recent changes fall far short of deregulation but have provoked a lot of discussion. 
     In March 2000 the cabinet submitted a bill to the Diet that it enacted in May of the same year 
to revise the Road Transport Law so that licenses to operate hire taxis or buses would be granted 
to any operators that meet safety standards.  But the new law allows the transport ministry to 
                                                 
3On the facts regarding the MK group’s maverick fares refer to: Iguchi Tomio, chiiki koutsuu to 
shite no takushii jigyou (the taxicab firm as regional transportation), ch. 8 in Iguchi Tomio, ed., 
kisei kanwa to chiiki keizai — Kyoto-shi to shuuhen  chiiki no doukou (the regional economy 
and deregulation-- the trends in the city of Kyoto and its surrounding region), ryuukoku 
university social science research center monograph no. 25, zeimu keiri kyoukai, 1996.   
4Klein, Moore and Reja (1997) argue that enforcement of exclusive ownership rights in preset 
routes actually improves resource allocation and that hire taxis should therefore be disallowed 
from following bus routes. 
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exercise “emergency” measures to restrict entry into the taxi industry if the supply of taxis is 
deemed sufficiently excessive.  A transport ministry official was quoted in the newspapers as 
asserting that excessive supply of taxis could cause “abusive competition” that might lead to a 
decline in cab safety. (The Japan Times, February 29, 2000).  Also the new law leaves 
unchanged the system of regulating cab fares on the grounds that varying the fare system would, 
according to the bill itself, “confuse passengers”.  Such comments are of little help in 
understanding the true rationale for taxicab regulation.  The worldwide ubiquity and persistence 
of taxicab regulation affords ample evidence that such a rationale indeed exists.  In any case the 
new law has taken effect as of February 2002, essentially freeing entry while maintaining 
regulation of fares.  To evaluate the situation we need an economic model, the building of which 
is our next task. 
 
 
3. Economic effects of taxicab regulation 
 
     To evaluate the effects of regulation it is necessary to have a clear picture of the way an 
industry would operate in the absence of government control of entry and pricing.  To that end, 
we here develop a simple model of pricing and entry in the taxicab industry under laissez faire.  
But we begin with some brief comments on the previous literature regarding taxicab economics. 
     Douglas (1972) and Mohring (1972) propose models of cruising taxi and bus company profits 
respectively under the assumption that fares are exogenously set equal to marginal cost.  Both 
argue that under such a regime, at the economically efficient scale of operation, revenues would 
be insufficient to cover all costs which include the costs of operating vacant vehicles.  It is 
necessary to operate vacant vehicles if transport services of a given quality are to be supplied 
because an increase in the number of vacant vehicles decreases the average waiting time and so 
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is an economic good.  But the costs of operating vacant vehicles arise as a fixed cost of 
supplying transport of a given quality and so would be unremunerated in a regime in which the 
fare is set equal to the marginal cost.  Furthermore, a fare set higher than marginal cost would 
inefficiently discourage demand.  Thus it would seem, as argued by Arnott (1996), that in 
addition to a fare set equal to marginal cost, a flat subsidy is needed to attain a first-best 
allocation.  Beesley and Glaister (1983), Frankena and Pautler (1986), and Rometsch and 
Wolfstetter (1993) follow the same basic setup as Douglas.  These authors all treat the fare as 
exogenously determined, presumably by regulatory fiat.  Orr (1969) and DeVaney (1975) 
advance models which purport to characterize the laissez faire equilibrium, but do so by 
introducing the assumption that all cabs charge the same fare and its level depends in an ad hoc 
and deterministic way upon the parameters.  In other words in their models as in the others 
already mentioned, the fare is in fact exogenously determined, according to a possibly 
sophisticated rule it is true, but not necessarily one that mimics the outcome of a completely 
laissez faire regime.   
     As discussed in the introduction, we need to model the bargaining between individual cabs 
and their customers to learn about the determination of fares under laissez faire.  The excellent 
paper by Cairns and Liston-Heyes (1996) fully apprizes us of the analytic difficulties this entails.  
Specifically, if neither the cab driver nor potential customer know the other’s value of trading, 
then in the logic of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) no individually rational and incentive 
compatible mechanism exists that assures trade will occur in the instances where it would be 
efficient (that is where the customer’s valuation of a cab ride exceeds the cab driver’s 
opportunity cost of providing it).  The upshot is that it is difficult or impossible to fathom just 
exactly what the outcome of bargaining under asymmetric information might be.  But surely the 
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presumption of complete ignorance of  the respective private valuations is a bit extreme.  Some 
of the relevant influences on those values clearly are known by both parties such as the proposed 
length and duration of the trip. And perhaps the other influences on the private values do not 
vary so much among cab drivers and among potential customers respectively as to invalidate an 
economic model that presumes the values are in fact commonly known.  While of course not 
disputing the analytic correctness of Cairns and Liston-Heyes’ claims, I assert that a model of 
bargaining between cabs and customers based on an assumption of full information has potential 
empirical merit.  The assumption that cab driver and potential customer each know the other’s 
private valuations opens the way to apply the Rubenstein variant of the Nash bargaining model.  
This affords a very precise representation of the taxi industry under laissez faire that can be used 
as a standard for comparing alternative regulatory regimes.   We begin with the case of identical 
demanders but at the end of the essay discuss some implications of relaxing that assumption. 
 
Basic framework 
     We first set out some basic assumptions regarding demand and costs.  Suppose that each 





where q is the expected waiting time and u>0 and s>0.  Taxis cruise in a circle making one 
revolution per hour whether or not occupied.  Demanders wait at an arbitrary spot on the circle 
and hail the first idle cab that passes.  The expected waiting time for an idle cab (in hours) is thus 
the reciprocal of the number of idle cabs.   
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     There are N cabs with an average occupancy rate of t.  The flow demand (normalized to 
equal the number of demanders in the market) is y=tN.  Accordingly, the expected waiting time 
to hail a cab is: 
 
(2) q = 1/(N-y)=1/((1-t)N) =t/((1-t)y).   
 
 
Each demander’s willingness to pay is thus   
 
 
(3) v(y,t)=u-s t/((1-t)y).  
 
 
Let taxi costs be C=cN=cy/t.  If all customers are identical (s and v do not vary over the 
population), then the social welfare function is  
 
(4) W= 0òy v(z,t)dz - cy/t  
    = yu - s t/(1-t)  -  cy/t 
 
 
If there exists a number of cabs N >`y  (and an implied occupancy rate t =`y/N) such that W>0, 
then the socially efficient allocation entails serving all the`y demanders.  In that case the socially 
efficient occupancy rate (and implied efficient number of cabs in the industry) are such that 
¶W/¶t=0: 
 





(6) N*=+(s`y/c)1/2   
 
 
                                                 
5Write W=`yu -  s`y/(N-) -cN and find  ¶W/¶N= s`y/(N*-`y)2 -c=0. 
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Pricing under laissez faire 
     Now consider the industry equilibrium in the absence of regulation.  Each cab driver enters 
Nash bargaining over the fare with each individual customer that hails him; the agreed fare 
divides the gain from their trade with one another in a way that depends upon each’s disvalue of 
prolonging bargaining (See the appendix).   For a customer, the gain is the avoidance of waiting 
time (Cabs are identical and so all reach the same price bargain with any one customer).  For the 
cab, the gain depends on the price paid, the discount rate and the duration of the ensuing trip.  
Agreement confers revenue immediately and upon conclusion of the trip leaves the cab in the 
same situation as before but for the passage of time.  The value of agreement to the cab equals 
the fare minus the disvalue of postponing subsequent revenue for the duration of this trip.  The 
longer the trip the smaller are the gains to the cab corresponding to any given fare.  In the Nash 
bargaining, longer trips therefore command higher fares.  For example the present value of cab 
revenue under the zero profit condition equals the present value of cost  
              ¥ 
(7) 0ò e-rtcdt = c/r 
 
where c is the cost of operating a cab (flow per time period t) and r is the continuous discount 
rate per time period t.  Now the gain to the cab from a trip that has duration x and pays p is: 
 
(8) p- 0òx e-rtcdt   =  p -(1- e-rx)c/r   
 
In the interior solution of the Nash bargain, the price p is determined so that the gains to the taxi 
relative to those of the customer depend upon the taxi firm’s continuous discount rate r and the 
customer’s disvalue of prolonging bargaining (which we shall presume equal to the disvalue of 
waiting to hail a cab =s per time unit) 
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(9) (p - (1- e-rx)c/r) ¸ sq = s ¸ (r-s). 
 
For a general statement of the Nash bargaining solution refer to the appendix.  Nash bargaining 
between cab and customer as just described has some interesting implications.  First, find that    
 
(10) p = s2q/(r-s) +(1- e-rx)c/r 
 
From this, we have that: 
 
(11) ¶p/¶x = ce-rx > 0 
 
Longer trips command a higher price.  Furthermore  
 
(12) ¶2p/¶x2=-r ¶p/¶x. 
 
This tariff structure might be approximated by a simple two-part (affine) tariff of the sort that is 
common in the taxi business. 
     Additionally, 
 
(13) ¶p/¶q = s2/(r-s). 
 
As new firms enter, shortening the average waiting time to hail a cab (q=1/(N -`y)), the price 
will become lower if (r-s) is positive, which is the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
customers to realize any gain from trade at all.  (In the contrary instance r-s<0, the Nash bargain 
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confers the entire gain from trade on the taxi firm and p=u-sq. So in this instance, too, ¶p/¶q>0.  
Entry of cabs lowers the price.) 
     The fare depends on the customer’s disvalue of waiting s but not on his basic willingness to 
pay u.  In other words customers may well vary in their basic willingness to pay u without 
altering the fare structure in any way.  This suggests a way of slightly generalizing the model to 
allow differences among customers while still premising the fare on a presumption of bargining 
under complete information.  For instance the basic willingess to pay u might vary over the 
population of customers and yet they still all have the identical known disvalue of wait ing s...or 
perhaps s depends upon the distance of the proposed trip, those proposing shorter trips having a 
greater disvalue of waiting. I will not develop these more general models here but will later 
comment briefly on their implications.   
     In the present model, in the equilibrium under free entry, industry profit reaches zero: 
 
(14) p  = py-cN =0. 
 
Again assuming that all customers are identical and that all customers are served (and that the 
Nash bargaining has an interior solution) 
 
(15) p  = s2`y/ ((r-s)(N -`y)) + (1- e-rx)`yc/r) -  cN  
and  
(16) ¶p/¶N = -s2`y/ ((r-s)(N -`y)2) - c < 0. 
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As cabs enter, the number of vacant cabs increases and so the expected waiting time (=1/(N -`y)) 
becomes shorter and the average price per cab trip correspondingly smaller.  Industry revenue 
and profits decline as more cabs enter. The number of cabs that just attains zero profit NLF  is (if 
greater than zero)6: 
 
(17) NLF=N such that: s2`y/((r-s)(N -`y)) + (1- e-rx)`y c/r) -  cN = 0 
 
There are more cabs under laissez faire than is socially efficient if Nash bargaining greatly favors 
the taxi firms (s is much greater than r-s), and may be too few in the opposite case.  The 
fundamental reason for this is that the price that results from bargaining may be either greater 
than the marginal social benefit of adding a new entrant or less, and which it is depends, in part, 
on whether the bargaining is slanted in favor of the taxis or their customers. 
 
 
Models of regulation 
     As described in section 2 above, the Ministry of Transport of Japan (now known as the 
Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport) has, with only a few recent exceptions, insisted 
on uniformity of taxi fares within each geographic region.  In effect this has meant that the cab 
firms coordinate their annual requests to revise the posted fare, all asking for virtually the 
identical revision.  Consider therefore what fare would be set by the industry if acting in concert, 
given that the transport ministry limits entry to a maximum set number of cabs that does not 
                                                 
6It may well be that it is unprofitable to supply cab services at all (NLF=0) even though it is 
socially efficient to do so.  In principle, a subsidy could be necessary to attain the social 
optimum.  
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depend on the fare.  In other words, the fare p is set to maximize industry profit given N.  In the 
identical demanders case the industry then sets the fare so as to fully appropriate the consumers’ 
surplus.  Industry profit becomes identically equal to social welfare.  In this case the socially 
efficient rule in determining entry is to also maximize industry profit.  If free-entry is allowed 
with collusive fares, there will be more cabs operating than is socially efficient.  The Figure 1 
indicates the basic logic.  As drawn, NLF<N* (that is the number of cabs under free entry and 
laissez faire pricing is greater than is socially efficient), but as discussed above this is not 
necessarily always the case. 
     In the context of this simple example the prevalence of regulation of taxi markets the world 
over is readily explained.  To precisely the extent that regulation establishes a perfect cartel, 
social welfare is enhanced (This is true whether under laissez faire there are too many cabs or too 
few).  In Becker’s (1983) theory of competition among pressure groups, special interest groups 
seeking to establish regulations that eliminate deadweight losses are more likely to succeed.  The 
putative enhancement of social welfare has approximately the same effect as would a subsidy of 
political activity in support of the policy’s adoption. 
 
     It is a simple matter to compare the social welfare, industry profit, consumer surplus and 
average price under each of the four regimes.  With regard to the price (i.e. fare), first notice that 
under laissez faire pricing the average fare declines as there are more cabs and the average wait 
to hail a cab grows shorter.  Under collusive pricing, as the average wait to hail a cab becomes 
shorter the willingness to pay rises and the fare is raised too to appropriate it.  Thus the fare is 
lowest under complete laissez faire of both entry and pricing, next lowest under collusive entry 
conditions but laissez faire pricing, higher under a perfect cartel, and highest under collusive 
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fares but free entry.  Industry profit is greater under a perfect cartel than under collusive entry 
conditions and laissez faire pricing.  Industry profit is equal to zero under free entry whether or 
not fares are set collusively.  Consumer surplus is greater under complete laissez faire than under 
the other three regimes (in which it is equal to zero).  Social welfare is greatest under a perfect 
cartel and lowest of all under collusive pricing with free entry.  The ranking of social welfare 
under complete laissez faire and under laissez faire pricing but collusive entry conditions is 
ambiguous; it depends upon the relative bargaining positions of taxi firms and their customers. 
     Moving from a regime in which fares are set collusively but entry is free to one of complete 
laissez faire, will thus result in exit of firms, reduced fares, increased social welfare and 
increased consumer surplus.  Moving from a regime in which fares are set collusively and entry 
is controlled to one of free entry (but still collusive fares) will lead to entry, increased fares, 
reduced profit, and reduced consumer surplus. 
     Finally, it is appropriate to question how these results might be altered under the 
generalizations of the model alluded to earlier that allow non- identical customers. Suppose that  
each customer has the same willingness to pay posited above u-sq, but that the parameter u 
varies in a known way over the population: u~(u,`u).  Let us presume that each cab driver knows 
the value of s of each customer–either because it is the same for all customers or because it 
depends on other known facts such as the distance of the proposed trip.  In this instance the fare 
is determined according to the same rule as before.  Under laissez faire:  
 
(18) p= s2q/(r-s) +(1- e-rx)c/r. 
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But some customers that it would be economically efficient to serve given the actual number of 
idle cabs and implied waiting time q, may now not be served under laissez faire.  These 
customers would be served only if, holding the number of idle cabs unchanged, the fare were 
lowered to match the marginal cost of the cabs, or 
 
(19) p=(1- e-rx)c/r. 
 
In other words introducing the assumption of non-identical customers, so that the scale of the 
market demand  varies inversely with the level of fares, brings to light an additional distortion of 
the laissez faire allocation.  It is actually a monopoly distortion.  Although there may be many 
independently competing taxi cabs, each has some bargaining power with respect to each of its 
customers, which confers a modicum of economic rent and a wedge between price and marginal 
cost.   
     What about cartels and regulation under the non- identical demanders model? Continue the 
assumption that each customer’s basic willingness to pay u varies over the population but each’s 
disvalue of waiting s is identical (or at least known by the taxi firms).  A taxi cartel would not be 
able to fully appropriate consumer surplus if it did not know each customer’s full willingness to 
pay.  It would however adjust the number of cabs so that the number of vacant cabs and  implied 
waiting time of each customer was economically efficient, given the prices it set, which would 
lie above the laissez faire prices.  In other words, the simple monopoly distortion would be 
greater under a cartel than under laissez faire, but the distortion of the number of vacant cabs 
would be less.  Under collusive fares but free entry–one kind of regulatory regime–the monopoly 
distortion would remain but the number of vacant cabs would in fact be greater than the efficient 
 18
one given the fare.  Under regulation of both fares and entry a first-best outcome could in 
principal be achieved.  This would entail marginal cost pricing combined with a subsidy to bring 
about the efficient number of vacant cabs, exactly as described by Arnott (1996).   
      
  
6. Conclusion. 
     Taxicab industries the world over have been subject to regulation.  To understand the 
rationale and implications requires a convincing model of how the industry would operate in the 
absence of regulation.  This paper has proposed just such a model.  Its essential feature is that 
under la issez faire, price is determined by Nash bargaining between each cab and its customer, 
with complete information.  The agreed fare divides the gains from trade.  For a customer, the 
gain is the avoidance of waiting for the next cab (Cabs are identical and so all reach the same 
price bargain with any one customer).  For the cab, the gain equals the fare minus the disvalue of 
postponing subsequent revenue for the duration of this trip.  Even if all customers are wholly 
identical to one another and all are served, the equilibrium under laissez faire pricing and free-
entry will not in general entail the efficient number of vacant cabs and implied efficient waiting 
time to hail a cruising cab.  This distortion is peculiar to the cruising taxi industry.  A cartel 
would set higher fares than the laissez faire ones but would set the number of vacant cabs at the 
efficient level given the fares.  If customers have the same known disvalue of waiting for the 
next cab but have varying willingnesses to pay for taxi services then the bargaining model 
developed here still applies to the laissez faire pricing regime, but the implied wedge between 
price and marginal cost then entails an additional distortion besides the distortion entailed in the 
divergence of number of vacant cabs from the efficient level.  In other words, bargaining over 
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fares between each cab and customer entails a degree of local monopoly.  The rationale for taxi 
regulation now becomes apparent.  First, even if regulatory capture entails collusive fare setting, 
its net distortions are made less than they otherwise would be by the fact that under laissez faire 
too pricing entails a degree of local monopoly.  Second, even under regulatory capture, the 
number of vacant cabs would be set closer to the efficient level, given the prices, than would be 
true under laissez faire pricing and free entry. 
     Japan is the latest country to experiment with deregulation of the taxi industry.  From 
February 2002, entry into the industry has been largely freed of restrictions while fares remain 
subject to regulation.  Based on the analysis of this paper it would be better to deregulate fares 
also if free entry is to be allowed, lest the number of vacant cabs rises far above the efficient 
level.  In fact, freeing entry while continuing to regulate fares may actually be worse than 
continuing a regulatory regime that effectively entails both collusive fares and restricted entry.  
  




Appendix.  The Rubenstein Bargaining Game 7 
     Two persons must decide how to divide a dollar.  The first proposes that he himself receive 
some specific share, a1 say.  The second person, if he declines the original offer, proposes a 
counteroffer in which he himself should receive some specific share, a2  say.  And so on, back 
and forth.  Each round of offer and counteroffer requires time of length t.  After each round, the 
two bargainers, i=1,2, incur costs of delay equal to st in the case of the first person (the 
“customer”) and equal to the fraction 1-e-rt of the gross allocation in the case of the other (the 
taxi firm). 
     Now, the unique subgame perfect solution to this game is the pair (a1, a2) representing the 
share each proposes to allocate to himself whenever it is his turn to make an offer, for the 
situation before each player is essentially unchanging whenever it is his turn to make an offer.  
The bargaining proceeds as follows: 
      Customer's                 Taxi Firm's         
  Allocation        Allocation     
One  Net of Costs  Net of Costs 
Proposing:   of Delay:          of Delay:         
Customer (1)   a1                         1-a1 
Taxi (2)       1-a2 -st              a2e-rt 
Customer (1)  a1 -2st   (1-a1)e-r2t 
....and so on, until an offer is accepted. 
 
     Consider the characteristics of a1 and a2.  The taxi firm's initial counteroffer must be the least 
generous that it could expect the customer to accept: 
 1-a2 -st =a1 -2st 
In anticipation of such a counteroffer from the taxi, the customer's initial offer is the least 
generous it can expect the taxi to accept: 
 1-a1 = a2e-rt. 
Solving these two equations, we find that  
 a1 = 1 - st/(ert-1). 
The customer proposes this allocation and the offer is immediately accepted by the taxi.  The 
implication is that the share each obtains is larger, the greater is the opposite party’s cost of 
prolonging bargaining.  Furthermore, the first to propose an offer (in the example here, the 
customer) holds an advantage.  In the limit, as the successive rounds are presumed to transpire 
more rapidly, the “first-mover” advantage dissipates, but the respective costs of prolonging 
bargaining still influence the outcome: 
  lim  a1 = 1 - s/r,  and a2  =  1-a1 = s/r. 
   t®0  
Notice that for there to be an interior solution (our implicit assumption above)it must be that s<r. 
If s>r the solution becomes a2=1; the entire gains from trade go to the taxi. 
 
                                                 
7Based on: Ariel Rubenstein.  “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica, vol. 




Arnott, Richard (1996).  “Taxi Travel Should Be Subsidized”, Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 
40, pp. 316-33. 
 
Becker, Gary (1983).  “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol 98, pp. 371-400. 
 
Beesley, Michael E. and S. Glaister (1983).  “Information for Regulating: The Case of Taxis”, 
Economic Journal, vol. 93, no. 371 (Sept.) pp. 594-615. 
 
Cairns, Robert D. and Catherine Liston-Heyes (1996). “Competition and Regulation in the Taxi 
Industry”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 59, pp. 1-15. 
 
DeVaney, Arthur S. (1975).  “Capacity Utilization under Alternative Regulatory Restraints: An  
Analysis of Taxi Markets”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 83, no. 1 (Feb.), pp. 83-94. 
 
Douglas, George W. (1972).  “Price Regulation and Optimal Service Standards: The Taxicab 
Industry”, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, vol. 4, no. 2 (May), pp. 116-127. 
 
Frankena, Mark W. and Paul A. Pautler (1986).  “Taxicab Regulation: An Economic Analysis”, 
Research in Law and Economics, vol. 9, pp. 129-165. 
 
Iguchi Tomio. chiiki koutsuu to shite no takushii jigyou (the taxicab firm as regional 
transportation), ch. 8 in Iguchi Tomio, ed., kisei kanwa to chiiki keizai — Kyoto-shi to 
shuuhen  chiiki no doukou (the regional economy and deregulation-- the trends in the city 
of Kyoto and its surrounding region), ryuukoku university social science research center 
monograph no. 25, zeimu keiri kyoukai, 1996.  
 
Klein, Daniel B. , Adrian Moore and Binyam Reja (1997) Curb Rights: A Foundation for Free 
Enterprise in Urban Transit, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
keizai kikakuchou sougou keikaku kyoku (economic planning agency of the Japanese 
government, universal planning bureau). kisei kanwa no keizai riron (economic theories 
of deregulation), Government of Japan, 1989. 
 
Matsuzawa Toshio and Ishida Nobuhiro. douro ryokaku yusou (road passenger transport), ch.5 in 
Kanemoto Yoshitsugu and Yamauchi Hirotaka, eds., kouza: kouteki kisei to sangyou, 
yon-satsu: koutsuu (seminar: industry and public regulation, vol.4: transport), NTT 
publishing company, 1995, pp. 193-232. 
 
Mohring, Herbert (1972).  “Optimization and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation”, 
The American Economic Review, vol. 62, no. 4 (Sept.), pp. 591-604. 
 
Myerson, Roger B. and Satterthwaite, Mark A. (1983).  “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral 




Orr, Daniel (1969). “The ‘Taxicab Problem’: A Proposed Solution”, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 77, no. 1 (Jan/Feb), pp. 141-7. 
 
Rometsch, Stefan and Elmar Wolfstetter (1993).  “The Taxicab Market: An Elementary Model”, 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 149, no. 3, pp. 531-546. 
 
                        Rubenstein, Ariel (1982).  “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica, vol. 50, 
no. 1, pp. 97-109. 
 
Stiglitz,Joseph E. (1989).  “Imperfect Information in the Product Market”, in R. Schmalensee 
and R.Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam, pp. 769-847. 
 
takushii unchin seido kenkyuukai koukokusho (research center report on the taxi fare system). 
ch. 5 in: unyushou unyu seisaku kyoku, unyu keizai kenkyuu sentaa (ministry of transport 
of the government of Japan, transport policy bureau, center for research on transport 
economics) kore kara no ryokaku unchin --atarashii ryokaku unchin no seittei houshiki 























Figure 1.  Industry profit under market pricing p , and social welfare W (=industry profit under 
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